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This chapter takes as its starting point the growing phenomenon of people choosing no 
longer to believe in the religion of their heritage, in this case Islam. The data on 
religious identification shows how this is a significant issue in many European 
countries, some that have now gone beyond the 50 per cent threshold of people who 
do not express belief in a religion. In looking at some of the tensions this experience 
may create within debates on Islam, I was reflecting on Grace Davie’s notion of 
‘believing without belonging’, in her exploration of the transformation of Christianity and 
how people engage with it. I spoke at a conference a few years ago, when I 
deliberately changed that wording to talk about the need to find ways of ‘belonging 
without believing’.  
  
In contemporary debates around Islam in Western societies, often marred by politics of 
identity, one of the highly contentious issues that has emerged is the stigmatisation of 
people that leave their religion, to convert to another, or move to a position of 
agnosticism or atheism. This can become a serious concern with death threats, social 
isolation and a sense of being ‘cut-off’ from ones community, even family not unheard 
of. And yet the Qur’an asserts that, “there should be no compulsion in religion”. At the 
end of the chapter I propose a framework for thinking about this tension further, but it 
raises the questions of the relationship between Islam and terms such as ‘freedom’ (of 
religion), ‘humanism’, ‘secularism’ and ‘the secular’.  
  
  
The Secular  
  
The Quran is a scripture held as a divine source of light by Muslims, yet it should not 
follow from there, in automatic fashion, that it is at odds with the secular. In fact the 
earthly life is strongly affirmed and one could actually say that in some ways Islam is a 
‘secular religion’ in the sense that secular means temporal and earthly. One often finds 
references to focus the mind on both this life and the next:  
  
“And ordain for us good in the world and in the hereafter…” Qur’an 7:156  
  
The metaphor of human creation where Adam and Eve are sent to the earth, show the 
‘divine plan’, that they have been created for a temporal, earthly, secular existence. 
This was not a ‘fall’, but the purpose all along (as discussed below).  
  
The promise that ensues is that light, or inspiration, will be ‘sent’ from the numinous to 
the earthly. Accordingly, the stated purpose or use of this light is to work within a 
secular setting. The European memory of its history of religion is not often narrated as 
one of a complementing dimension, but more of as a ‘run in’ with, and that constraining 
  2 
the force of religion was necessary for the expansion of secular, rational and scientific 
progress. To some secular reformers today, the Muslim world may often feel like that; 
the Quran can be read as an inoculation against the ‘trappings of materialism’. But it 
can also be read as seeking a settlement on earth, fertilizing the expansion of worldly 
progress, being a part of, and not apart from, the life of this world. In fact, the Qur’an 
appears to challenge other religious communities that it considers to be too ‘other 
worldy’, saying: “O People of the Book, do not go to excesses in your religion.” (Qur’an, 
4:171)  
  
Are these contrasting readings about the temporal existence – to ward off or to 
embrace – equally weighted in their claim? Both readings do at least exist and, across 






Free will is the very essence of the human spirit. According to the narrative of the 
Qur’an, and its story of creation, it is free will that differentiated humanity at the point of 
creation. The story begins with an announcement of intention by God to the assembly 
of angels:  
  
“I wish to place a vicegerent upon the earth...” (Qur’an, 2: 30)  
  
The angels suggested that (as a result of free will) man would “cause mischief (on the 
earth) and shed blood,” God replied, “I know that which you do not” – thus giving divine 
license to this unique aspect of humanity and acknowledging that while freedom may 
lead to corruption, it is only through the exercise of free choice that the human spirit 
can reach the heights for which it was intended. This free choice, therefore, must 
include within it the ability to say ‘no’, even to God. A forced faith, or even a forced (or 
‘enforced’) practice of religion can only be an inferior version of that practice and 
temporal coercion can never truly convince the heart of a truth.  
  
This is why the Qur’an asserts that there should be “no compulsion” in faith. The 
opportunity to believe can only be truly realised and valued when there is also an 
opportunity to disbelieve. Of course, no freedom is absolute and all those involved in 
the debates acknowledge the need for some laws and rules to regulate behaviour – 
otherwise there would be chaos. But such laws should be about preventing harm, 
rather than enforcing religious practice.  
  
While Eastern traditions have tended to focus more on responsibility and duty than on 
freedom, the European experience has been the struggle to win precious freedoms 
from monarchs, aristocrats, the Church and others who wielded power – leaving 
Europeans with a particular penchant for the notions of individual freedoms and rights. 
It may be argued that Muslim notions of authority, hierarchy and respect tend to be 
romanticised, while Western conceptions of these values have come to be read with 
more sceptical undertones.  
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The notions of respect, for example, seem quite different. Muslims have learned to 
respect religious symbols and icons more than the people that follow those symbols - 
even though the Prophet Muhammad taught that the life of a single person is more 
precious than the most sacred site in Islam: “the Kaba, and all its surroundings”. Yet 
today, an attack on the reputation of the Prophet or his family, or a holy site would 
cause outrage, but an attack on an ordinary Muslim may go unnoticed.  
  
However, in the British climate of free speech, institutions and representatives of 
religion are often seen to be fair targets for ridicule, possibly because of the cynicism 
towards authority and power (especially of a religious nature), but laypeople are rarely 
subject to the same treatment. Our notions of freedom, and conversely of offence, are 
culturally contingent. They are not absolutes. The environment in Britain is one in 
which humour is often self-deprecating. Being able to laugh at oneself is a very British 
way of expressing self-confidence, and those unable to do so are seen to be nervous 
and possibly having something to hide.  
  
With the exception of anti-democracy activists who decry the Western political slogans 
of freedom as an anti-Islam plot, even orthodox Muslims speak a language of freedoms 
– in the very least an appeal to a freedom to practice their religion. Traditionally, a 
language of ‘rights’ or of passive tolerance or ‘live and let live’, inspired by verses such 
as, “to your religion, to me mine” (Qur’an, 109:6) and a freedom to choose one’s 
religion as part of God’s design has emerged as the discourse. The tie-in of human 
“freedom” with a central Quranic verse yields a discourse around “freedom of religion” 
and, by extension, around a pseudo-human rights discourse. Atheism, for example, is 
thus framed as a choice. This does not alter the theological teachings around such a 
choice (that it falls short of recognising the gifts of God), but it does begin to reposition 
the social relationships that such an outlook can create. Furthermore, faith is seen as 
something that cannot be forced, it has to be a choice. Piety has to emerge from within 
and an attempt to feign it takes one towards the territory of hypocrisy, which is seen to 
be worse than open disbelief because it involves deception.   
  
  
Humans before believers  
  
The voice of the Qur’an speaks to all human beings and one of the often-repeated 
configurations of its discourse is addressed to ‘humanity/mankind’.  
  
“O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made 
you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (Not that you may despise 
each other).”  (Qur’an 49:13).   
  
Such a verse seems to indicate an inclusive vision of humanity, in which ethnic and 
religious differences are to be celebrated and seen as a form of enrichment. A yet 
more explicit verse says:  
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“To every one of you We have appointed a way and an open road. If God had willed, 
He would have made you one nation; but that He may try you in what has come to you. 
So be forward in good works; unto God shall you return, all together; and He will inform 
you about that in which you used to differ.” (Qur’an, 5:48).  
  
One is thus acutely aware that this life is one in which differences may be manifest, but 
such differences should not become the source of contention and division, let alone 
hatred or violence. We are to live in humility, to carry out good works, and then when 
we return to God the truth claims of our positions will be finally resolved. Our focus in 
this life should therefore not be on judging others, but on our own performance.  
  
Another verse talks of the important identity of being human and how that in itself 
carries a tremendous dignity: “We have conferred honour upon the Children of 
Adam...” (Qur’an, 17:70).  
  
Belief in God was most often presumed in historical societies across the world, let 
alone the East. Early Islam encountered Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians (all three of 
whom were accepted as ‘people of the book’) and pagans but there is very little 
mention of encounter with atheism. Islamic history, therefore, provides little or no 
precedent for theological or social responses to Atheism. The Madinan charter shows 
that Muhammad’s instinct was to create a society where all the residents of the time 
were regarded as a single community (ummah), regardless of faith or belief.  
  
  
Epistemological opening (and closing)  
  
In his work on humanism and Islam, Ebrahim Moosa (2011) discusses the role of 
critical Muslim thinkers and scholars in learning from a wide range of sources. It was 
because they were open to learning from the Graeco-Roman, Persian, Indian, Chinese 
and other sources of knowledge that the translation movement at the time of the 
Abbasid ‘House of Wisdom’ (Bayt al-Hikma) was able to be so creative. This era led to 
a vast step-up in Islamic thought that had an impact on wide range of scholarly 
disciplines including philosophy, science, mathematics, art and literature. Above all, 
one sees the tremendous role that reason played in Muslim thought at that time (and 
paved the way for influencing European thought).  
  
To thinkers such as Miskawayh (d. 1030), the idea of al-Insaniyya (humanity / 
humanism) was the goal of an ethical outlook of Islam (Goodman, 2003). Miskawayh 
charted out a pre-modern notion of ‘evolution’ in which he advocated that energy was 
infused into matter, which developed into mineral form, then into vegetable matter, 
which progressed to lower life forms and eventually became higher life forms. Similar 
ideas were also shared by the earlier Ikhwan al-Safa, a secretive intellectual and 
spiritual order around the 10th century.  
  
Some Muslim thinkers advanced the idea that there are two forms of revelation – the 
type that one can read as the ‘word of God’ (scripture), and the type that one can ‘read’ 
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from the natural world all around us. The epistemological work of Ibn Sina (d. 1037) on 
the latter influenced the Andalusian Ibn Tufayl (d. 1185), who borrowed from Ibn Sina 
and wrote his own version of a fictional work, Hayy ibn Yaqdhan, which tells the story 
of a boy that grew up on a remote island without human contact and how he came to 
develop knowledge of the truth (of God) through reason. This work was translated into 
Latin by Edward Pococke in 1671 (under the title, Philosophus Autodidactus) and then 
into English by Simon Ockley in 1708 (entitled The Improvement of Human Reason). 
The text had a profound impact on, for example, Locke (d. 1704) (who was a student of 
Pococke) and his ideas around the tabula rasa as well as on the theories of empiricism 
that developed in Western thought.  
  
The point here is to illustrate that at a time of an open embrace and engagement with 
humanity and diverse sources of knowledge, a creative and vibrant interchange and 
evolution of learning can take place. Yet, when defensiveness, suspicion of others, fear 
and mistrust set in – as one may argue is currently a challenge for Muslim thought – 
that vibrancy dissipates, leading to a downward spiral of fear, mistrust, and closing of 
doors. How then does one prepare to engage with the challenges that the modern 
world presents, including the challenge of modernity and secularisation and what these 
mean to a religion that feels (correctly, or incorrectly) under threat? There are some 
Muslim thinkers in the last century, such as Iqbal (d. 1938), who have taken on the 
mantle of open intellectual engagement with the philosophical world around them, but 
many more of such figures are needed. From the late nineteenth century one could 
hear calls for renewed thinking (ijtihad) and reform (islah) in the Muslim world. Iqbal 
played a significant role in helping Muslims think about the nature of the world after the 
demise of the Ottoman Empire and create a reasoned vision for a post-colonial society 





We often hear that Islam has no sense of separation of ‘church and state’, that there is 
an absence of the teaching of ‘render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s’. But a close 
scrutiny of Islam, and the life of Muhammd, show that even in the teachings of 
someone that personified the ‘religious’ for Muslims, a compartmentalisation between 
‘worldly matters’ and ‘religious matters’ was actually quite clear.  
  
Muhammad once came across some people that were artificially pollinating palm trees. 
He disliked the idea and commented that it would be better not to do this. However, as 
result of following his advice, the harvest in the following year was poor. When the 
farmers complained to him, he openly admitted the limitation of his knowledge 
regarding secular affairs and said: “If a question relates to your worldly matters you 
would know better about it, but if it relates to your religion then it belongs to me” 
(hadith, Sahih Muslim).  
  
In the early twentieth century preoccupation with the caliphate, the ‘Islamic state’ was 
seen as a symbol of Muslim unity and its restoration as vital in defending Muslim 
interests and procuring justice in a post-colonial context. However, in reality, there has 
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been a well-established normative distinction (albeit in premodern settings) between 
the temporal, sovereign authority and the institutions of religion in the Muslim world, 
with the latter mainly advocating autonomy and resenting their co-option by the state 
whenever that did happen. In The Failure of Political Islam, Olivier Roy (1994) argues 
that "a de facto separation between political power" of sultans and emirs and religious 
power of the caliph was "created and institutionalized ... as early as the end of the first 
century of the hegira". Roy points to an early separation of powers in which the state’s 
religious functions and worldly administrative arms, including its systems of legal 
arbitration, were organised as distinct organs. Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) asserted 
more than a century ago that Islam is not a theocracy and that there is a distinction 
between the ‘religious’ and ‘worldly’.   
  
With the immense disappointment of Muslims with the various national projects often 
couched (even if at times with little more than lip-service) in the name of Islam—Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan, etc., there is a growing recognition that a 
liberal, secular democracy is a good model for ensuring accountable, open societies 
that can protect the rights of all citizens of the state.  
  
This may go some way in explaining why Islamic parties contesting modern political 
debate through a democratic national election have historically fared very poorly, even 
in a country like Pakistan, which is arguably the only modern nation state to emerge as 
an independent Islamic country (though this is a contested description), and where the 
emotion of a Muslim identity runs deep, the most established and organised religious 
parties make little impact in their chief aim of forming a majority government. Cries of 
corruption and foul play among other factors are commonly cited as a reason, but any 
objective assessment of political (as opposed to moral) offerings points to stark and 
obvious limitations in the quest for government. In setting out the democratic case for 
government, religious parties have very little to offer by way of a secure economic 
policy, national aspiration or welfare reform.   
  
The instinct of the demos, the national vote bank, is not to trust religious parties with 
the national purse anymore than they would with a surgical operation. Religion after all 
has always had a medicinal as well as a moral offering. Yet it would be considered 
absurd by most to leave an advanced physical ailment in the hands of religious 
teachers. The application of scientific disciplines to human affairs within the 
economically and socially advanced nations of the world is thus an emergent challenge 
to an Islamic thought that makes an inconsistent qualification of human progress, by 
embracing material scientific enquiry but resisting world advancement in the 
humanities. This dichotomy, already sensed by the Muslim populace, will inevitably 
have to give way to a more coherent approach.   
  
Within the nation state, there is a growing, if unappreciated, list of Muslim majority 
countries that wear a secular political system on their sleeve. Turkey is routinely cited 
as the example, and it is significant in key ways, not least because it is within Europe 
and had a central role in the latter part of Islamic political history. But Turkey holds a 
strident narrative of its own enlightenment struggle and therefore presents a  
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contentious and questionable model of harmonising faith and secularism. In addition to 
Turkey, states which do not claim a religious name for their system, and can be 
considered as variants of a secular model for a Muslim majority population, include 
Albania, Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Guinea, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Senegal, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  
  
Even within the largest Muslim populations, there are strong undertones of a secular 
approach to national governance. In Indonesia’s five founding principles, the Pancasila, 
which forms the philosophical foundation of the nation state, is a confident attempt to 
‘square’ secularism with a majority Islamic faith. Indonesia has the largest Muslim 
population in the world, and consists in fact of a multiplicity of distinct island cultures. 
The Pancasila is a concept that has invited differing opinions regarding its religiosity, 
but successive Indonesian leaders have shown it to be flexible enough to assert a 
strong secular dimension despite its first principle proclaiming belief in God (not “Allah” 
or “Islam”) as the national faith. The Pancasila has allowed the largest Muslim 
population to assert itself as a country for Muslims but not an Islamic nation state, in a 
way that the second largest nation, Pakistan, has not been able to.   
  
It is precisely around this question of the whole Pakistan “project” that the philosophical 
basis of Pakistan politics and the politics of its national identity revolve. The founder 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah (d. 1948) insisted on a white column on Pakistan’s national flag, 
to symbolize its minority population of other faith communities as a clear indicator of 
purpose – indeed, within his immediate family there were cross-religious marriages that 
were free of family taboo. Twenty years after Pakistan was founded (Jinnah died a year 
after independence, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) emerged as a progressive 
socialist party. It began as a communist leaning political force in opposition to the then 
government’s support for America, with strong socialist messages and goals. By the 
1970s, its rallying cry of “Roti, Kapra aur Makan” (food, clothing and housing) saw it 
form a government on a secular base.   
  
Pakistan and Indonesia then, represent large scale, complex examples of a popular will 
and a political determination to find a civil space for religious neutrality where the 
national framework is dominated by a single religion. Through their challenges and 
policy aims, and whilst they remain far from a religiously neutral base by Western 
standards, they do point to a quest for a modern existence where Islam can thrive as a 
religion and the state can thrive as a plural society.   
  
However, the story is more complex than that; an absence of religious rule (and ‘on 
paper’ separation of religion and state) does not automatically imply genuine freedom 
and liberty, given the role of the military and authoritarian tendencies in many Muslim 
countries. Furthermore, ‘secularism’ in the Muslim world has, in the past, been 
associated with forced ‘westernisation’ (Turkey for example) and / or double standards 
(e.g. support for dictatorships). This means that Muslim publics are often very sceptical 
of the term ‘secularism’ (though as mentioned previously, not necessarily the notion of 
separation).  
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While advocating secularism, I am not for the disappearance of religion, nor for an 
anticlerical and closed-minded laïcité (see Birt and Hussain, 2011). Rather, I see 
secularism as a good way of managing the public debate and structuring society, 
especially where multiple religious, ideological and belief positions may collide. So 
there is a conversation to be had about the extent, nature and mode of religious 
presence in the public sphere. The differentiation made by Rowan Williams (2006) 
between procedural secularism and programmatic (anti-clerical secularism) is a helpful 
one here. Given the plural nature of that presence perhaps the Rawlsian notion of 
‘public reason’ (1999) can help—especially in a culture of very low religious literacy? 
But it seems that we also need to reach a point where religious voices can be given 





We have looked at some of the ideas that could be important building blocks within 
Muslim thought for a more nuanced and compassionate interaction between people 
that find themselves on different sides of the religion and atheism divide. Based on this, 
we can see that some of the potential areas of tension can be negotiated by using 
resources that are deeply embedded in the Muslim heritage and tradition. The idea of 
whether a person is free to believe or not believe; the choice of how much they should 
observe if they believe; the notion of fundamental human rights and equality of human 
beings; non-discrimination of people on the basis of their religious identity; how a 
secular society can both protect religions and the rights of individuals; the use of 
reason in the interpretation of sacred texts to allow for more contextually rooted 
religious discourses – all these are based on traditional views, but can also lay the 
ground for a set of open and inclusive interpretations of Islam that can help to look 
ahead to meet the challenges we face in society.  
  
The Western world is home not just to significant numbers of Muslims, but also 
significant subgroups of Muslims. There is no such thing as a singular ‘Muslim 
community’. Within that diversity, a wide spectrum of religious practice can be found in 
a very dynamic landscape that has come to represent ‘Muslim identity’. The idea that 
belonging, being part of something, is based on a common and shared belief may be a 
useful one, but in my view it is not enough in the very complex, hyper-diversity that we 
live in today.  
  
The greatest challenge of the future is about how we live with difference, not how we 
promote similarity. Such a future has an amazingly bright and exciting prospect, but it 
needs to be based on a sense of openness, compassion and respect that allows 
people to be themselves, without judgment, without prejudice, without pigeonholes. I 
am passionate about my beliefs. And part of that belief is that we need spaces where I, 
and others who may not believe in the way that I do, or choose not to believe in 
anything ‘religious’, can share a sense of belonging, commonality and mutuality. Before 
we are believers, we are human. There is a distinction between ‘being’ and ‘believing’. 
And we need to find ways in which we can be human together, even if we don’t believe 
together.  
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"Shall I tell you what is better than much prayer and charity?" They said, "Yes." He 
said, "mending discord between people. And beware of hatred - it strips away your 
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